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1 Introduction
Due to rich endowments of waterfalls, the price of hydro power has historically been low
compared to the prices of alternative energy and electricity prices in other countries. The
Norwegian economy has been adjusted to this situation. Nearly 100 percent of the elec-
tricity production in Norway is based on hydro power, and the electricity share in total
Norwegian energy demand was 50 percent in 2003, see Statistics Norway (2004). Except
from oﬀshore production of oil and gas, the most export oriented industries are highly elec-
tricity intensive. However, increasing marginal costs in Norwegian hydro power production
and environmental concerns imply that further growth in electricity demand must be met
by supplies from other sources than domestic hydro power. Domestic production of gas
power is a much discussed alternative. Investments in transmission capacity and dereg-
ulation of the Norwegian electricity market have already resulted in extensive electricity
trade between the Nordic countries. Since most of the electricity supply in the Northern
European countries is based on thermal power, increased or new indirect taxes on fossil
fuels will raise the electricity price also in Norway. In eﬀect, the electricity price facing
Norwegian firms and households will to a larger extent be determined in a common Nordic
market, and is likely to be significantly higher than it traditionally has been. This paper
provides a quantitative assessment of the long run demand responses in the Norwegian
economy to a permanent increase in the electricity price.
However, the need for yet another such assessment may be questioned. There is already
a large literature on estimation of aggregate energy price elasticities, most of them studying
residential energy demand. Madlener (1996) provides a comprehensive survey, including
an assessment of the strengths and the weaknesses of the various approaches found in the
literature. Other relevant literature surveys include Bye, Langmoen and Aasness (2004),
Liu (2004), Dahl (1994), Pindyck (1979) and Taylor (1977). What does this paper add to
the existing literature?
The credo motivating this paper is that aggregate price elasticities provide limited
information about the adjustments taking place in the wake of an increase of the electric-
ity price. Their informative value is confined to a highly reduced form of the underlying
economic mechanisms. An aggregate price elasticity sheds no light on the empirical impor-
tance of the diﬀerent kinds of substitution eﬀects and other adjustments within firms and
households generating the aggregate response. It is therefore of little help when one wants
to explain what goes on in a particular economy when the electricity price changes. An
aggregate response will be consistent with several plausible stories. The credibility of the
aggregate elasticity would increase if it can be presented as the weighted sum of diﬀerent
quantified eﬀects that have a clear economic interpretation. So would the possibilities for
3
cross-checking the results.
The substantive purpose of this paper is to support an estimate the aggregate price
sensitivity of the Norwegian electricity demand with a story of the empirical importance
of the various adjustments made by firms and households that contribute to the aggregate
response. Specifically, the ambition is to identify the importance of general equilibrium
eﬀects. From a theoretical point of view two general equilibirum eﬀects deserve special
interest in a small open economy like the Norwegian. First, assuming competitive equilib-
rium, constant returns to scale production functions and given world prices, an increase in
the electricity price must be met by a reduction in the price of at least one other factor of
production. More generally, the equilibrium change in the relative price structure, which
drives the substitution eﬀects within firms and households, includes endogenous price ef-
fects as well as the initial increase in the electricity price. Second, the industry structure
may change. In a stylized small open economy producing traded goods only, the relatively
most electricity intensive industries will contract, whereas other sectors will expand. Such
a change in the aggregate factor intensities caused by reallocations of resources between
industries with diﬀerent factor intensities is well known from the international trade theory
as the Rybczynski eﬀect. It represents a substitution eﬀect which is conceptually diﬀer-
ent from factor substitution within firms. The relevance of general equilibrium eﬀects on
both the industry structure and the relative price structure increases if the intention is to
estimate long run rather than short run price sensitivity. This paper provides a decom-
position of the aggregate price elasticity which makes it possible to identify the relative
importance of these general equilibrium eﬀects. Specifically, the analysis estimates the
empirical importance of the following eﬀects:
1. Factor substitution within 25 production sectors and substitution eﬀects in household
demand due to a partial increase in the electricity price.
2. The corresponding substitution eﬀects caused by general equilibrium adjustments in
other prices than the electricity price. Other prices are aﬀected through two channels.
First, the cost eﬀect of a higher electricity price is shifted forward to the prices of non-
traded goods both directly and indirectly through the input-output structure of the
economy. Second, the cost eﬀect of the rise in the electricity price will deteriorate the
international competitiveness. In order to maintain the external balance, the wage
rate must fall. Directly and indirectly, this general equilibrium adjustment of the
wage rate aﬀects the substitution eﬀects involving electricity demand.
3. Rybczynski eﬀects caused by changes in the industry structure
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4. Adjustments to a higher electricity price take place at several stages in the production
structure. The electricity share in the energy demand may be reduced, but the energy
intensity in the composite of all inputs may also be reduced.
5. A rise in the electricity price will have macroeconomic income eﬀects on total de-
mand, which also aﬀects the electricity demand.
6. The purchaser prices of electricity diﬀer due to diﬀerences in transmission costs
and indirect taxes between diﬀerent consumers. The uniform electricity price net
of these cost components will subsequently be referred to as the reference price
of electricity. Most of the diﬀerence between the purchaser price and the reference
price is additive. Consequently, the relative change in the purchaser prices will diﬀer
between consumers, and they will be smaller than the percentage rise in the reference
price. The sensitivity of electricity demand in a given sector with respect to the
reference price will be less the weaker is the dependency between the purchaser price
in the sector and the reference price.
The methodological purpose of the paper is to present the method used for quantitative
identification of each one of these eﬀects. To this end we define a general equilibrium
demand function for electricity by imposing a specific closure rule on a large CGE-model
of the Norwegian economy. This model, MSG6, has been developed with the particular
purpose of analysing long run trends in the supply and demand for energy in Norway. For
the simulations discussed in this paper the electricity price is exogenous, whereas electricity
demand can be separated from electricity supply. By using appropriate decomposition
techniques it is possible to quantify the contribution from the various mechanisms in the
aggregate electricity demand corresponding to the list above. The decomposition scheme
developed in this paper also serves as a useful tool to shed light into a large and complex
model that might be regarded as a black box. The relevance of both the concept general
equilibrium demand function, as well as the decomposition method is obviously not limited
to the Norwegian economy.
The substantive and the methodological purposes of this paper are related to Longva,
Olsen and Strøm (1988). They use a CGE model to estimate so-called total elasticities
of energy demand in the Norwegian economy. Their CGE model is a predecessor of the
model used in this paper. The models share some similarities with respect to sectoral detail
and factor demand. However, the models also diﬀer substantially. In particular, the model
used by Longva et al. described essentially the price sensitivity of a closed economy, since
exports and import shares were exogenous, and world prices of exports and import were
assumed to be endogenously determined in Norwegian markets. Thus, the scope for changes
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in the industry structure was more limited in Longva et al. (1988) than in this study.
Methodologically, Longva et al. decomposes their total demand elasticities in a diﬀerent
way than the method applied in this paper. Longva et al. separates output-constrained
elasticities from the total elasticities. The output-constrained elasticities are calculated by
keeping the output levels for diﬀerent groups of industries constant. However, this implies
a diﬀerent closure rule of the model, which aﬀects the relative prices and thereby the
substitution eﬀects. This paper accounts for more eﬀects, and they are all computed from
the same model simulation.
The paper is organised as follows. Section 2 defines precisely what is meant by a general
equilibrium demand function. Section 3 provides an overview of the CGE-model with
focus on the most important determinants of the electricity demand. Section 4 develops a
decomposition of the aggregate electricity demand from production sectors and households.
Section 5 presents the main insights from the simulation experiment and the use of the
decomposition scheme by estimating the identified components of the aggregate price
sensitivity. The results are compared with estimates in related studies. Conclusions are
drawn in Section 6.
2 A General Equilibrium Demand Function
While it is easy to argue that several general equilibrium eﬀects are relevant for the ag-
gregate electricity demand, it is not obvious how one should define a general equilibrium
demand function for a specific good. Within a general equilibrium framework it is con-
ceptually problematic to compute a demand function since all markets balance through
endogenous adjustments of relative prices. How should one define and compute the change
in electricity demand - not supply - caused by an exogenous change in the electricity price?
The general equilibrium demand function used in this paper can be precisely defined by
taking the following reduced form of a general equilibrium model of a Small Open Economy
(SOE) as a point of departure:
Xi = Si
¡
PT , PN ,W,P
E , Z
¢
, i ∈ S (1)
Si
¡
PT , PN ,W,P
E , Z
¢
−Di
¡
PT , PN ,W,P
E , Z
¢
= Ti, i ∈ S (2)
Tj = 0, j ∈ N (3)X
i∈S
fik
¡
PT , PN ,W, P
E, Z
¢
= Fk, k ∈ F (4)
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DE
¡
PT , PN ,W,P
E , Z
¢
= SE
¡
PT , PN ,W,P
E , Z
¢
. (5)
S is the set of all production sectors, and N is the set of non-traded goods/sectors ex-
cept electricity, E. F is the set of production factors. There are n sectors in addition to
the electricity sector. PN is the vector of endogenous prices of non-traded goods, except
electricity. W is the vector of endogenous factor prices, and PE is the endogenous price
of electricity. Z is a vector of the exogenous variables in the model, including constant
parameters. Di (.) is the aggregate demand function associated to good i, and electricity,
E. PT is the vector of exogenous prices of traded goods. Xi is the production of good i,
and Si (.) is the corresponding supply function. It is assumed that production technologies
in all sectors exhibit decreasing returns to scale, and the supply functions and the factor
demand functions are derived from the first order condition of profit maximization, i.e.
∂πi(PT ,PN ,W,PE ,Xi,Z)
∂Xi = 0, j ∈ S, where πi
¡
PT , PN ,W, P
E, Xi, Z
¢
is the profit function
of sector i. Ti is the excess supply (demand) of good i, which is equal to the net export
(import) of this good determined in (2). fik (.) is the demand for factor k from sector
i. The budget constraint underlying the demand functions is assumed to imply balanced
trade, i.e.
P
i∈T PiTi = 0. (3) and (4) express that supply equals demand in all markets
for factors and non-traded goods. (5) is the equilibrium condition for the electricity mar-
ket, assuming that electricity is a non-traded good. . The equations determine a unique
solution for the endogenous variables X,T,PN ,W, and PE as functions of PT , FK and Z,
where X is the vector comprising X1, ...,Xn etc.
Our general equilibrium demand function is defined by letting the electricity price
be exogenous and replacing (5) by two separate identities, which define, respectively,
aggregate demand and supply of electricity, i.e. E ≡ DE
¡
P1, P2, ..., Pn, PE , Z
¢
and
TE ≡ SE
¡
P1, P2, ..., Pn, P
E , Z
¢
. The relevant equation system now consists of the equa-
tions included in (1)-(4, and the equation defining aggregate electricity demand. This
implies that E will depend on all the equilibrium mechanisms that are captured by the
model when the solutions for T,PN and W balances trade as well as supply and demand
in all markets for factors and non-traded goods, except the electricity market.
3 Electricity Demand in a CGE-Model of the Norwegian
Economy
3.1 The CGE-Model: An Overview
The applied CGE model, MSG6, is explicitly designed to analyse the Norwegian energy
markets in a long run macroeconomic context. Heide, Holmøy, Lerskau and Solli (2004)
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explains the structure and the empirical properties of the model. MSG6 includes back-
ward looking dynamics related to accumulation of fixed capital and financial assets, as
well as forward looking dynamics derived from intertemporal behaviour of producers and
consumers with perfect foresight. From the general equilibrium theory of a small open
economy, see e.g. Woodland (1982), we know that changes in industry structure may con-
tribute significantly to the price sensitivity of the total electricity demand. The model is
suﬃciently disaggregated to capture this eﬀect; it specifies 60 commodities and 40 produc-
tion sectors, and the classification is chosen to make the model well suited for studies of
industrial policies as well as energy issues. Specifically, the model singles out the three ex-
tremely electricity-intensive and export oriented industries producing, respectively, Metals,
Industrial Chemicals and Pulp and paper.
The Norwegian economy is small, and the exchange rate is normalised to unity. Thus, all
agents face exogenous world prices. Financial capital is perfectly mobile across borders, and
the interest rate is exogenously given in international capital markets. Fixed capital and
labour are assumed internationally immobile. However, all goods, services and production
factors are perfectly mobile between industries within the economy. Supply equals demand
in all markets but the electricity market in all periods. Tax rates and real government
consumption are exogenous. The public budget constraint is satisfied through endogenous
lump-sum transfers. Parameters are estimated or calibrated on the basis of the Norwegian
National Accounts and relevant micro-econometric studies.
The time paths of private consumption of 26 consumer goods and labour supply are
determined by an infinitely lived representative consumer who maximizes an intertemporal
utility function subject to an intertemporal budget constraint. The consumer has perfect
foresight and considers prices as exogenous. The decision problem of the consumer can be
solved by a stepwise budgeting procedure due to a nested system of origo-adjusted CES
structure of the utility function (see Figure 1 in Appendix).
All firms in the private business sector are run by managers who maximise the net
present value of the cash flow to owners. Commodities produced by primary industries
are assumed to be homogenous and traded in perfectly competitive markets. Domestic
markets for manufacturing goods and services, which constitute the main part of the
economy, are described by monopolistic competition among firms. In the export markets
Norwegian firms are price takers. Bowitz and Cappelen (2001) and Klette (1999) provide
econometric support for monopolistic price setting in the domestic market. It is assumed
costly to reallocate deliveries between the domestic and foreign markets.
The model captures that output and input in an industry may change both because
of changes at the firm level and as a result of endogenous entry or exit of firms. The
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model includes a rough description of productivity diﬀerentials between firms within the
same industry causing firms to diﬀer in size and profitability, see Holmøy and Hægeland
(1997). Based on the econometric work in Klette (1999) the production structure in all
private industries exhibits decreasing returns to scale. This has two implications: First,
the traded goods sector becomes more diversified than in the case of constant returns.
Second, decreasing returns imply adjustment costs related to real capital formation. In
all industries the composition of the input factors is derived from a nested structure
of linearly homogeneous CES-functions (see Figure 2 in Appendix). The parameters in
the factor demand functions are calibrated to the econometric estimates Alfsen, Bye and
Holmøy (1996, Ch. 3).
3.2 Electricity demand
Equilibrium in the electricity market implies
E =
P
j∈P
Ej +E
O +EH +EZ , (6)
where E is the total supply, net of power loss in the transmission and distribution system.
Ej is the electricity demand in the private industry j ∈ P , where P denotes the set of
private industries. EO is government consumption, EH is household consumption, and
EZ is net exports. In the following we confine the analysis to electricity demand from the
domestic business sector and households.
3.2.1 Private Industries
In the separable production structure electricity is combined with fuels, F , to form energy
input U = U (E,F ). At this and all other nests in the separable technology the functional
form is the Constant Elasticity of Substitution (CES) function with constant returns to
scale. The contingent electricity demand function is
Ej = ej
Ã
PEj
PUj
!−σUj
Uj , (7)
where j ∈ P . ej is the share parameter of electricity in the CES function, and σUj is the
elasticity of substitution between electricity and fuels. PUj is the ideal energy price index
defined as
PUj =
h
ej
¡
PEj
¢1−σUj + (1− ej) ¡PFj ¢1−σUji 11−σUj (8)
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where PEj and P
F
j are the industry specific prices of electricity and fuels, respectively.
Alfsen, Bye and Holmøy (1996, Ch. 3.3) describes the econometric estimation of the con-
tingent electricity demand function in (7).
Energy is combined with Machinery, KM , to produce ”Services from Machinery”
N = N
¡
U,KM
¢
. N is combined with labour, L, to produce the input R = R (N,L).
R is then combined with transport services, T , to produce a ”Modified Value Added”
RT = RT (R,T ). RT is combined with ”Other Materials”, V , to the composite input
S = S
¡
RT , V
¢
. Finally, S is combined with Buildings and Constructions, KB, to produce
the composite of all inputs V F = V F
¡
S,KB
¢
. The energy demand function then becomes
contingent on V F :
Uj = Z
U
j
Ã
PUj
PNj
!−σUj Ã
PNj
PRj
!−σRj Ã
PRj
PRTj
!−σRTj Ã
PRTj
PSj
!−σSj Ã
PSj
PV Fj
!−σV Fj
V Fj , (9)
where the coeﬃcient ZUj summarizes the intensity parameters in the nested CES-demand
functions, and the relevant CES-price indexes are defined successively analogous to PUj .
The aggregate input V Fj is used to produce export deliveries , X
W
j , and domestic
deliveries, XHj . In MSG6 it is assumed that the cost function is additively separable in the
costs associated with these two deliveries. The same decreasing returns to scale technology
applies to both kinds of deliveries:
V Fj = v
H
j
¡
XHj
¢ 1
sj + vWj
¡
XWj
¢ 1
sj , (10)
where 0 < sj < 1 is the scale elasticity. Typically, a description of the optimal factor
demand stops at this point. The optimal industry demand for electricity and other input
factors would then be contingent on, respectively, export deliveries and domestic deliv-
eries. However, changes in the industry structure is a priori important for the aggregate
electricity demand, and both export supplies and import shares are quite elastic with re-
spect to the factor price index. Therefore, we include the determination of exports and
domestic deliveries in this formal description.
Firms are price takers in the export markets. The export supply function becomes
XWj = a
W
j
Ã
PWj
PV Fj
! sj
1−sj
,
where PWj is the world price in the export market for good j, and a
W
j is a constant. In
MSG-6 sj is set close to 0,85, which implies that the price elasticity of exports is as large
as sj1−sj ' 6.
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In the domestic markets products from Norwegian firms are close but imperfect sub-
stitutes for corresponding imported products. Firms engage in monopolistic competition.
The optimal price setting rule takes the form:
PHj = βHj
PV Fj
sj
¡
XHj
¢ 1
sj
−1
, (11)
where PHj is the price of product j in the domestic market, and βHj is the mark-up factor,
which is multiplied with the marginal cost of domestic deliveries. The domestic demand
for product j produced by the corresponding domestic firm, XHj , is given by
XHj = δHj
Ã
PHj
PHIj
!−σHIj
Dj , (12)
where δHj is the share parameter of domestic varieties in the CES sub-utility function
of domestic and imported varieties of good j, and σHIj is the elasticity of substitution
between domestic and imported varieties of good j. Dj is total domestic demand for the
composite good j, being the sum consumption, gross investments and the total use of good
j as intermediate input in all production sectors. PHj is the price of domestic varieties, and
PHIj is the ideal price index of the composite of domestic and imported varieties defined
by
PHIj =
h
δHj
¡
PHj
¢1−σHIj + ¡1− δHj ¢ ¡P Ij ¢1−σHIji , (13)
where P Ij is the import price of product j. Inserting the expressions for P
H
j and P
HI
j in
(11)and (13) into (12) yieldsXHj as a function of P
I
j andDj. Changes in industry electricity
demand result from factor substitution eﬀects caused by changes in relative factor prices,
a change in export caused by changes in the exogenous world price, a change in the import
share caused by changes in the price of domestic deliveries relative to the exogenous import
price, as well as changes in the domestic demand from households, private industries
and the government production sectors. Tracing the electricity demand further would
require accounting for all the mutual interactions between sectors and markets. A formal
description of this would be too complex to be enlightening.
3.2.2 Households
Household demand is described by one representative consumer. His utility function is
separable, see Figure 2. The parameters in the corresponding demand system are estimated
in Aasness and Holstmark (1995).
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Electricity is consumed for two purposes: i) Heating (UH) and ii) Use of electric equip-
ment (D). Household consumption of electricity, EH , is
EH = EHO +E
H
M , (14)
where EHO denotes electricity used for Heating, and E
H
M denotes electricity used on elec-
tric equipment. Heating is obtained by combining EHO with Fuels, F
H , according to an
Origo-adjusted CES (OCES) production function. The OCES functional form allows non-
homothetic preferences so that the model captures the econometric findings of non-unitary
contingent expenditure elasticities. The contingent demand function for EHO takes the form
EHO = E¯
H
O + eO
µ
PEH
PUH
¶−γU
UH , (15)
where E¯HO is the exogenous ”minimum consumption level”, and γU is the elas-
ticity of substitution between EHO − E¯HO and FH − F¯H . We have PUH =h
eO
¡
PEH
¢1−γU + (1− eo) ¡PFH¢1−γU i 11−γU . The contingent demand function for EHM is anal-
ogous to (15):
EHM = E¯
H
M + eM
µ
PEH
PD
¶−γD
D, (16)
where PD =
h
eM
¡
PEH
¢1−γD + (1− eM) ¡PMH ¢1−γDi 11−γD .
Heating and Dwellings, R, enter the OCES subutility function H = H
¡
UH , R
¢
, where
H denotes ”Housing related consumption”. The contingent demand function for UH be-
comes
UH = U¯H + u
µ
PUH
PH
¶−γH
H. (17)
H, D, Transport, and ”Other Consumption” are combined into the CES composite
”Goods and Services”, CH . CH is then combined with Leisure into the CES composite
”Full consumption”, NH . The demand functions for H and D, contingent on NH , become
H = H¯ + h
µ
PH
PCH
¶−γC
c
µ
PCH
PNH
¶−γN
NH , (18)
D = D¯ + d
µ
PH
PCH
¶−γC
c
µ
PCH
PNH
¶−γN
NH , (19)
where PCH is the price index of C
H , γC is the elasticity of substitution between H, D,
Transport, and ”Other Consumption”. γN is the elasticity of substitution between CH
and Leisure, and PNH is the ideal price index of Full Consumption.
Full Consumption enters an intertemporal CES utility function. The time horizon is
infinite. When net-of-tax interest rate is assumed equal to the rate of time preferences,
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the Frisch-demand function for Full Consumption in period t takes the form (see Bye and
Holmøy, 1992):
NH (t) =
£
λPNH (t)
¤−γI , (20)
where γI is the intertemporal elasticity of substitution, and λ is the marginal utility of
wealth, which is endogenous in the model, but constant over time.
3.3 Equilibrium mechanisms in the Electricity demand response
Although the demand responses to an increase in the electricity price are the result of a
large number of complex simultaneous interaction eﬀects, it is instructive to explain them
as a three-step iteration process.
Step 1: Firms and households reduce the electricity intensity in their use of inputs
and consumption. Despite factor substitution the price of energy and energy intensive
machinery increases. Thus, the substitution eﬀects on several other margins than the
energy composition aﬀect the decrease in electricity demand.
The increase in the electricity price implies a positive shift in the cost functions of firms,
depending on the direct and indirect electricity intensity of their production structure. This
implies a contraction of exports so that the equality between the given world prices and the
marginal costs of export supplies is restored in all industries. Recall that export supplies
are quite elastic with respect to a shift in the price index of aggregate inputs relative to
the world price. At this stage in the iteration process domestic deliveries will also decrease
because the prices of domestic products relative to the import prices increase.
Step 2: At this stage we take into account that the adjustments in exports, domestic
deliveries and domestic demand balance all product markets, except the electricity market.
However, the labour market will not be in equilibrium, and the intertemporal constraint
on foreign debt will not be met. More precisely, there will be unemployment since the
scale eﬀect of reduced output will dominate the factor substitution eﬀect caused by the
rise in the electricity price. The economy will accumulate exploding foreign debt since
exports are reduced whereas import shares have increased. In order to restore labour
market equilibrium and the foreign debt constraint the wage rate and the utility level
of the consumer must adjust. As explained in greater detail in Holmøy, Olsen and Strøm
(1998) the new general equilibrium is characterised by a lower wage rate and a lower utility
level. Basically, the wage rate reduction is necessary to neutralize the negative eﬀect on
international competitiveness caused by the higher electricity price. The wage reduction
13
turns the excess labour supply derived in Step 1 into excess labour demand. Labour market
equilibrium is restored by the decrease in private consumption and leisure that follows a
reduction of the utility level.
Step 3: At this stage we take into account that the decrease in the wage rate and
the utility level aﬀect the electricity demand. First, the wage rate reduction reinforces the
substitution eﬀects on electricity intensities in factor demand and private consumption.
Second, the wage rate reduction implies, cet. par, improved international competitiveness,
which raises exports and reduces the import shares in domestic demand. The resulting
output eﬀect will increase electricity demand. Third, the reduction in private consumption
has a negative eﬀect on electricity demand.
4 Decomposing the Price Sensitivity of Aggregate Electric-
ity Demand
At a trivial first stage we decompose the change rate in the total electricity demand from
domestic firms and households:
Eˆ =
EP
E
EˆP +
EH
E
EˆH , (21)
where we in the following writes marginal relative change rates as Eˆ = dEE .
4.1 Private Industries
The total input of electricity in private industries can be written
EP =
X
j∈P
ZEj V
F
j , (22)
where ZEj =
Ej
V Fj
. The change rate of EP can be written
EˆP =
X
j
λEj ZˆEj +
X
j
λEj Vˆ Fj = ZˆE + Vˆ F + cov
Ã
ZEj
ZE
, Vˆ Fj ;λV Fj
!
, (23)
where ZE = E
P
V F
is the aggregate or average electricity intensity, V F =
P
j V
F
j , λEj =
Ej
EP
,
λV Fj =
V Fj
V F
. V Fj is measured in fixed prices. Zˆ
E =
P
j λEj ZˆEj is defined as the weighted
average of the change rates of the industry specific electricity intensities. cov
µ
ZEj
ZE
, Vˆ Fj ;λVj
¶
=
P
j λV Fj
µ
ZEj
ZE
−
P
j λV Fj
ZEj
ZE
¶³
Vˆ Fj −
P
j λV Fj Vˆ Fj
´
is the weighted covariance between
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the industrial electricity intensities and the change rate of aggregate input by industry,
where the weights are λV Fj .
(23) decomposes the relative change in EP into 1) substitution eﬀects, i.e. the relative
change in the average electricity intensity (of the private business sector) attributable to
changes in the industrial electricity intensities ZˆE ; 2) reallocation eﬀects, i.e. the relative
change in the average electricity intensity attributable to changes in in the allocation of ag-
gregate input between industries with diﬀerent electricity intensities, cov
µ
ZEj
ZE
, Vˆ Fj ;λV Fj
¶
;
3) scale eﬀects, i.e. the relative change in the total aggregate input, Vˆ F . We will now
decompose further the substitution and scale eﬀects.
4.1.1 Substitution Eﬀects
According to the nested CES structure of factor demand, the relative changes in ZEj can
be written
ZˆEj = −σUjθUFj
³
PˆEj − PˆFj
´
− σNjθNKMj
³
PˆUj − PˆKMj
´
(24)
−σRjθRLj
³
PˆNj − PˆLj
´
− σRTjθR
T
Tj
³
PˆRj − PˆTj
´
−σSjθSV j
³
PˆRTj − PˆVj
´
− σV FjθV FKBj
³
PˆSj − PˆKBj
´
,
where θUFj = PFj Fj/
³
PEj Ej + P
F
j Fj
´
is the cost share of F in energy costs in industry j,
θNKMj is the corresponding cost share of KM in the the composite input N , and so forth
for the other cost shares.
(24) distinguishes the substitution eﬀects at diﬀerent levels in the separable input
structure. MSG-6 computes all factor prices entering (24), and the model contains empiri-
cal counterparts to all other variables in this expression. Specifically, the model computes
the relative changes in the prices of other factors than electricity. Except for labour, all
these factors are in general composites of imports and domestically produced goods. In
MSG-6 four main mechanisms determine the changes in these factor prices:
1. The factor composites contain a share of electricity, which declines as one ”moves
upwards” in the nested input structure from energy to the aggregate input V Fj .
2. The increase in the electricity price implies a positive shift in the cost functions
in all industries using electricity directly or indirectly. By mark-up pricing this shift is
transmitted to the prices of domestic deliveries. Through the input-output structure of
the economy the prices of capital goods and intermediate goods will also increase.
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3. As pointed out in the previous section, the wage rate must fall in order to restore
general equilibrium. The wage rate reduction is also transmitted to the prices of other
produced inputs.
4. The changes in the industry outputs will aﬀect the relative prices since the produc-
tion functions exhibit decreasing returns to scale.
Formally, the eﬀects of a rise in the electricity price on the prices of composite inputs in
the nested production are determined recursively: PˆUj = θUEjPˆEj + θUFjPˆFj , PˆNj = θNUjPˆUj +
θNKMjPˆKMj , PˆRj = θRNjPˆNj + θRLjPˆLj , PˆRTj = θRTRj PˆRj + θRTTj PˆTj , PˆSj = θSRTjPˆRTj + θSV jPˆVj ,
PˆV Fj = θV FSj PˆSj + θV FKBjPˆKBj .
From (24) various decompositions ZˆEj can be made. The one chosen in this paper is
the following:
ZˆEj =
¡
−σUjθUFj + εUEj
¢
PˆEj + εAj, (25)
where −σUjθUFj is the relative change in the input of electricity in industry j attributable
to the increase in the electricity price contingent on a given level of energy input, Uj. εUEj
captures the total eﬀect on U of a partial increase in the electricity price, contingent on
V Fj :
εUEj = −
h
σNjθNKMj +
³
σRjθRLj + σRTjθR
T
Tj θRNj
´
θNUj
+
³
σSjθSV j + σV FjθV FKBjθSRT j
´
θRTRj θRNjθNUj
i
θUEj < 0.
εAj captures the eﬀect on ZEj of general equilibrium eﬀects on other prices than the
electricity price:
εAj =
X
s=F,KM,L,T,V,KB
εEsjPˆ sj ,
where the ε-coeﬃcients are functions of the relevant substitution elasticities and cost
shares. They are defined formally in the Appendix.
The relative change in the average electricity intensity can then be written
ZˆE =
X
j
λEj ZˆEj (26)
=
¡
−σUθUF
¢
PˆE + cov
³
−σUjθUFj, PˆEj ;λEj
´
+εUEPˆE + cov
³
εUEj, PˆEj ;λEj
´
+ εA, (27)
where
¡
−σUθUF
¢
≡
P
j λEj
¡
−σUjθUFj
¢
, εUE ≡
P
j λEj εUEj, εA ≡
P
j λEj εAj , PˆE ≡P
j λEj PˆEj .
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The motivation for introducing the covariances in (26) is that the relative change in
the purchaser price of electricity will diﬀer between industries when the common reference
price increases. This reflects industry specific indirect tax rates and distribution costs, as
well as price discrimination between industries.
We can obtain quantitative information about the importance for ZˆE of the general
equilibrium eﬀects working through changes in other prices than the electricity price by
decomposing εA, which was defined above as the weighted average of εAj:
εA =
X
s=F,KM ,L,T,V,KB
h
εEsjPˆ s + cov
³
εEsj , Pˆ sj ;λEj
´i
, (28)
where εEF , εEKM etc. are the weighted averages of the corresponding industry specific
price elasticities, where the weights are the industrial electricity shares. PˆF , PˆKM etc. are
similarly defined averages of the corresponding industry specific factor prices.
4.1.2 Scale Eﬀects
The scale eﬀects are comprised by the relative change in total aggregate input Vˆ F =P
j λV Fj Vˆ Fj . Logarithmic diﬀerentiation of (10) yields
Vˆ Fj =
Xˆj
sj
, (29)
where the relative change in output equals the weighted average of the relative change rates
of domestic deliveries and exports, i.e. Xˆj ≡ vFHj XˆHj +
³
1− vFHj
´
XˆWj , where v
FH
j ≡
V FHj
V FH
,
V FH =
P
j V
FH
j and V
FH
j = v
FH
j
³
XHj
´ 1
sj .
Vˆ F can now be decomposed as follows:
Vˆ Fj =
⎡
⎣X
j
λV Fj
µ
1
sj
¶⎤
⎦
⎡
⎣X
j
λV Fj Xˆj
⎤
⎦+ cov
µ
1
sj
, Xˆj;λV Fj
¶
=
1
s¯
X
V Fj
X
j
λXj ZV Fj Xˆj + cov
µ
1
sj
, Xˆj ;λV Fj
¶
=
1
s¯
"
Xˆ + cov
Ã
ZV Fj
ZV F
, Xˆj ;λXj
!#
+ cov
µ
1
sj
, Xˆj ;λV Fj
¶
, (30)
where 1s¯ ≡
P
j λV Fj
³
1
sj
´
, ZV Fj =
V Fj
Xj
, λXj =
Xj
X , X =
P
j Xj . Xj are volume indexes
measured in fixed prices. The weighted covariance cov
³
1
sj
, Xˆj ;λV Fj
´
, based on the factor
shares λV Fj as weights, is non-zero because the scale elasticities diﬀer between industries.
However, this variation is small. The weighted covariance cov
µ
ZV Fj
ZV F
, Xˆj;λXj
¶
, is non-zero
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if the sectoral factor intensities, ZV Fj , diﬀer. Such heterogeneity has a positive impact
on the total demand for inputs, and thereby electricity, if there is a positive correlation
between the sectoral expansion and the sectoral factor intensities.
4.2 Households
Logarithmic diﬀerentiation of (14) - (20) yields
EˆH = αHO EˆHO + αHM EˆHM , (31)
where αHO =
EHO
EH
, and αHM =
EHM
EH
. Moreover,
EˆHO =
µ
1− E¯O
EHO
¶h
γUθUF
³
PˆFH − PˆEH
´
+ UˆH
i
,
EˆHM =
µ
1− E¯M
EHM
¶h
γUθDM
³
PˆMH − PˆEH
´
+ Dˆ
i
,
where θUF and θDM denote the cost shares of, respectively, fuels in the energy expenditure
allocated to heating, and household equipment in the total expenditure allocated to the
use of this equipment. We can then write
EˆH = αHO
µ
1− E¯O
EHO
¶h
γUθUF
³
PˆFH − PˆEH
´
+ UˆH
i
(32)
+αHM
µ
1− E¯M
EHM
¶h
γUθDM
³
PˆMH − PˆEH
´
+ Dˆ
i
.
As explained above, energy used for heating is combined with services from the stock of
housing capital, R, in an OCES-function for housing related consumption H˙. Logarithmic
diﬀerentiation yields
UˆH =
µ
1− U¯
H
UH
¶h
γHθHR
³
PˆR − PˆUH
´
+ Hˆ
i
, (33)
The relative changes in H and D become
Hˆ =
µ
1− H¯
H
¶h
γC
³
−
¡
1− θCHH
¢
PˆH + θCHD PˆD + θCHT PˆTH + θCHA PˆA
´
+ CˆH
i
Dˆ =
µ
1− D¯
D
¶h
γC
³
−
¡
1− θHD
¢
PˆD + θCHH PˆH + θCHT PˆTH + θCHA PˆA
´
+ CˆH
i
. (34)
The optimal composition of material consumption and leisure, and of the time profile
of full consumption, imply that the relative changes in CH and NH can be written
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CˆH =
h
γNθNHL
³
PˆLH − PˆCH
´
+ NˆH
i
NˆH = −γI
³
λˆ+ PˆNH
´
,
where PˆCH and Pˆ
N
H denote the relative changes in the price indexes associated with marginal
variations in, respectively, material consumption and the cost of living index.
5 A CGE Decomposition of Aggregate Price Sensitivity of
Electricity Demand1
In this section we quantify the components in the price sensitivity of aggregate electricity
demand by simulating the special version of the MSG6 model described in Section 2. First,
we simulate a reference scenario where the reference price of electricity is kept constant
over time. We then simulate an alternative scenario in which the reference price is 1 percent
higher than in the reference scenario, whereas all other exogenous variables follow the same
paths as in the reference scenario. We confine the discussion to the stationary eﬀects, which
are obtained after 10-15 years. The dynamics of the simulated price sensitivity is relatively
modest.
5.1 Aggregate picture
The simulation shows that the 1 percent increase in the reference price reduces aggre-
gate electricity demand from Norwegian firms and households by 0.31 percent, see Table
5.1. The demand reduction in the private business sector accounts for almost all of the
reduction in total domestic electricity demand. The contribution to the total demand re-
duction from household demand is only 0.04 percent, reflecting a 0.13 percent reduction of
electricity consumption and that the households consume about 1/3 of the total domestic
electricity demand.
Table 5.1. Decomposing the change in aggregate electricity demand of a
1 percent increase in the reference price of electricity. Contributions from
changes in main demand categories. Percentage change rates
1More detailed decompositions are given in Holmøy (1998).
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Change in total domestic demand (Eˆ) = 1+2+3 -0.309
(1) Contribution from private industries = (1a)x(1b) -0.266
(1a) Share of total demand (E
P
E ) 0.510
(1b) Change in demand (EˆP ) -0.530
(2) Contribution from households = (2a)x(2b) -0.043
(2a) Share of total demand (E
H
E ) 0.320
(2b) Change in demand (EˆH) -0.134
(3) Contributions from other sources 0.000
Interpreted as an aggregate own-price elasticity, the figure -0.31 is almost identical to
the estimated long run own-price elasticity for final energy consumption in the UK by
Hunt and Manning (1989). Their point estimate is -0.30. However, the study by Hunt
and Manning, like most other related international studies, estimate the price elasticity of
energy, not electricity, demand. When comparing the results in this paper with estimates
of price elasticities of energy demand, one should keep in mind that energy demand is
likely to be less price sensitive than electricity demand, since the latter can be substituted
by other energy carriers. The estimate by Hunt and Manning is in line with the findings in
Dahl (1994), Kouris (1983) and Prosser (1985), Bentzen and Engsted (1993). Dahl (1994)
reports that the own-price elasticities of energy demand elasticities in about 50 studies for
the developing world average -0.33. She also concludes that intermediate energy demand
in individual industries is more price elastic than both aggregate industry demand and
total demand. The latter pattern is also found in Table 5.1. Based on aggregate time-
series data for the OECD countries, the estimates of the own-price elasticity in Kouris
(1983) and Prosser (1985) vary between -0.15 and -0.43. Bentzen and Engsted (1993)
estimates the corresponding long-run elasticity for Denmark to be -0.47. Older surveys by
Pindyck (1979) and Taylor (1977) suggest that the long run own-price elasticity of total
energy demand ranges from -0.3 to -0.5. Lower own-price elasticities, also for electricity,
is estimated in Liu (2004) using panel data covering the period 1978-1999 for the OECD
countries. On the other hand, Fiebig, Seale and Theil (1987) found that the aggregate
energy own-price elasticity ranges from -0.66 to -0.88.
5.2 Private business sector
Table 5.2 decomposes the electricity demand reduction in the private business sector into
contributions from 1) factor substitution within industries, 2) scale eﬀect caused by changes
in aggregate factor demand, and 3) factor substitution attributable to changes in the indus-
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try structure. About 3/4 of the demand reduction can be allocated to factor substitution
within industries. Whereas the contribution from the scale eﬀect is negligible, changes in
the industry structure accounts for a significant share (about 1/4) of the demand reduction
from the business sector. Most of this Rybczynski eﬀect can be attributed to a contraction
of the industries producing, respectively, Pulp and paper, Chemical raw materials, and
Metals, which are the most electricity intensive industries. These industries are also ex-
port oriented, which implies that the elasticities of output with respect to the price index
of the composite factor input in these industries are higher than in other industries.
Table 5.2. Decomposing the price sensitivity of electricity demand from
private industries into substitution eﬀects and scale eﬀects. Percentage change
rates
Change in electricity demand from private industries = 1+2+3+4 -0.525
(1) Substitution eﬀect (ZˆE) -0.387
(2) Scale eﬀect, i.e. average growth in factor demand (Vˆ F ) -0.009
(3) Covariance el-intensities and changes in industry structure -0.136
(4) Approximation error 0.007
Interestingly, Longva et al. (1988) found roughly the same price elasticity of electricity
demand from private industries as in the present study. Their estimate also took general
equilibrium eﬀects into account. However, their model, MSG4, diﬀered from the one used
in this paper in several important respects. Specifically, their model did not include forward
looking dynamics, and labour supply was exogenous. The most important diﬀerence is,
however, that exports and import shares were exogenous in the model used by Longva et
al.. Consequently, the scope for Rybczynski eﬀects were much smaller in their model than
in the study presented in this paper. This explains why reallocation of resources between
industries plays a less significant role in their study than in the present one. On the other
hand substitution eﬀects within households and industries contribute less in the present
study than in Longva et al. (1988).
Interpreted as an own-price elasticity of electricity demand in the aggregate Norwegian
business sector, -053 is greater in absolute value than the estimates in Hesse and Tarka
(1986). Based on panel data on electricity demand in the European manufacturing industry
over the period 1973-1980, they find own-price elasticities between 0.14 and -0.49. Field
and Grebenstein (1980) estimate a more price sensitive behaviour for US manufacturing
in 1971. Based pooled cross-section data, their estimates range from -0.54 to -1.65.
Table 5.3 decomposes the within-industry substitution eﬀects along two dimensions.
First, we compute the substitution eﬀects at diﬀerent levels in the nested structure of factor
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demand. Second, we distinguish between substitution eﬀects caused by the exogenous
increase in the electricity price and the corresponding substitution eﬀects caused by the
endogenous equilibrium adjustments of other factor prices.
The decomposition shows that the latter set of substitution eﬀects has a negligible
impact on the electricity demand from private industries. This is, however, basically not
a result of small technological substitution possibilities. Rather, it reflects very small en-
dogenous equilibrium adjustments of prices of other inputs but electricity. Moreover, the
reduction of electricity demand is foremost due to lower energy intensity in the composi-
tion of energy, machinery and labour. To a small extent the endogenous fall in the wage
rate reinforces this substitution eﬀect. The composition of energy is almost unaﬀected. In
particular, this is the case for industries with a high electricity share in total energy use,
since the rise in the electricity price then is transmitted to an almost proportional surge
in the energy price.
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Table 5.3. Decomposing the substitution eﬀect in private industries into
contributions from changes in diﬀerent factor prices. Percentage change rates
Average substitution eﬀect = 1+2+3+4 (ZˆE) -0.387
(1) Contribution from increased electricity price (1.1+1.2+1.3+1.4): -0.372
(1.1) Subst. between electricity (E) and fuels (F ) (=
P
j λEj
¡
−σUjθUFj
¢
PˆEj ) -0.025
(1.2) Subst. between energy (U) and machinery (KM) -0.203
(=
P
j λEj
³
Uˆj − Nˆj
´³
V Ej
V Uj
´
PˆEj )
(1.3) Subst. between machinery/energy (N) and labour (L) -0.142
(=
P
j λEj
³
Nˆj − Rˆj
´³
V Ej
V Nj
´
PˆEj )
(1.4) Subst. between other factors (=
P
j λEj
³
Rˆj − RˆTj
´³
V Ej
V Rj
´
PˆEj ) 0.000
(2) Contribution from changes in other factor prices (2.1+2.2+2.3+2.4): -0.018
(2.1) Subst. between electricity (E) and fuels (F ), 0.000
(2.2) Subst. between energy (U) and machinery (KM) -0.003
(2.3) Subst. between machinery/energy (N) and labour (L) -0.014
(2.4) Subst. between other factors -0.001
5.3 Households
As pointed out above, the relatively weak price sensitivity of the households’ electricity
demand partly reflects that the consumer price of electricity increases by only 0.5 percent
when the reference price increases by 1 percent. The reason is that the electricity con-
sumption in physical units is the basis for transmission costs and indirect taxes. Table 5.4
shows that the demand response is somewhat stronger for electricity used for heating than
for the electricity demand related to the use of electric equipment.
Table 5.5 shows that the composition of energy used for heating is relatively insensitive
to the increase in the electricity price, because the initial electricity share in the energy
demand is very high. More significant is the reduction of the total use of energy for heating.
This eﬀect contributes to 0.11 percent of the reduction in electricity demand for heating
when the reference price of electricity is raised by 1 percent. The increase in the relative
price of energy implies an incentive to substitute Housing capital for energy, which should
be interpreted as more resources spent on isolation and other energy economizing measures.
Much more econometric work has been done on residential energy demand than on
industry demand. Madlener (1996) provides a comprehensive survey, including an assess-
ment of the strengths and the weaknesses of the various approaches found in the literature.
Bye, Langmoen and Aasness (2004) survey econometric studies of residential electricity
demand in the Nordic countries. They conclude that one can not reject the hypothesis
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that the price and income elasticities are equal in these countries. The average of the
own-price elasticity estimates is -0.5, reflecting a substantially more price sensitive behav-
iour than the corresponding response in MSG6, which is based on Aasness and Holstmark
(1995). Using data for 51 high, middle-, and low-income countries from 1970, 1975 and
1980 Seale, Walker and Kim (1991) estimate both income and own-price elasticities of
residential energy demand to be larger than what they regard as the ”consensus” values.
They estimate the own-price elasticities of total energy demand to be near unitary for
low-income countries and between -0.8 and -0.9 for all others. For Norway the own-price
elasticity is estimated to be -0.87.
Table 5.4. Decomposing the price sensitivity of electricity demand from
households. Percentage change rates
Change in electricity demand from households = 1+2+3 (EˆH) -0.134
1. Contribution from Heating (= αHO EˆHO ) -0.076
1.1. Electricity share of Heating (αHO ) 0.490
1.2. Change in electricity use for Heating (EˆHO ) -0.157
2. Contribution from use of Electric Equipment (αHM EˆHM) -0.056
2.1. Electricity share of use of Electric Equipment (αHM) 0.510
2.2. Change in electricity use for Electric Equipment (EˆHM) -0.111
3. Approximation error (= EˆH −
³
αHO EˆHO + αHM EˆHM
´
) -0.004
Table 5.5. Decomposition of the change in electricity used for Heating by
households. Percentage change rates
Change in electricity used for Heating (EˆHO ) -0.157
1. Substitution between electricity and other energy (E
H
O
UH
) = -(1.3)×(1.1-1.2) -0.050
1.1. Increase in the purchaser price of electricity (PˆEH ) 0.537
1.2. Increase in the purchaser price of energy (PˆUH ) 0.480
1.3. Eﬀective elasticity of substitution between (EHO ) and (F
H) = 1.3.1×1.3.2 0.878
1.3.1. Marginal elasticity of substitution between (EHO ) and (F
H). i.e. σUH 0.800
2. Scale eﬀect from change in energy used for Heating (UH) = 2.1×1.3.2 -0.107
2.1. Change in energy used for Heating (UˆH) -0.097
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6 Conclusions
This paper has used a special closure of a large scale CGE model of the Norwegian economy
to estimate the aggregate sensitivity of domestic electricity demand to changes in the
electricity price. A primary intention of the analysis has been to account for and quantify
the contribution to the aggregate price sensitivity from a wide range of eﬀects, including
diﬀerent substitution eﬀects in the household demand structure and in heterogeneous
production sectors, changes in the industry composition of the private business sector, as
well as general equilibrium eﬀects on the relative price structure and aggregate demand.
The analysis supports the following conclusions:
1. The electricity demand from Norwegian Mainland firms and households falls by 0.31
percent when the reference price of electricity is raised by 1 percent.
2. The equilibrium adjustments of the private production sectors in the private Main-
land economy account for 87 percent of the aggregate demand response. Whereas
the demand response in the production sectors is in line with several international
studies, household electricity demand is less price sensitive than in international
studies.
3. The macroeconomic contraction resulting from the rise in the electricity price is too
small to have but a negligible eﬀect on the aggregate price sensitivity. The change
in relative prices is the main determinant of the demand adjustments.
4. The change in the relative prices is basically due to the increase in the electricity
price and the transmission of this change into other purchaser prices through the
input-output structure of the economy. As a general equilibrium eﬀect the wage rate
must fall. However, the wage rate reduction is only 0.04 percent per percent increase
in the reference price of electricity, which is too small to have a significant eﬀect on
relative prices.
5. Within industry factor substitution contributes most to the reduction of the elec-
tricity intensity of the aggregate production sector. This eﬀect accounts for 0.39
percentage points of the 0.53 percent reduction in total electricity demand from pri-
vate Mainland industries per percent increase in the reference price of electricity.
The most important substitution eﬀect is the reduction of the energy-labour ratio.
6. Reallocations of resources between industries with diﬀerent electricity intensity in
their factor composition contribute by 0.14 percentage points to the 0.53 percent
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reduction in total electricity demand from private Mainland industries. This real-
location eﬀect is basically a result of the high elasticity of output with respect to
marginal costs in the export oriented electricity intensive industries.
A relevant criticism of the results presented in this paper is that the distinction between
the contribution from within sector substitution eﬀects and eﬀects caused by reallocation
between sectors includes an element of arbitrariness. The relative empirical importance of
these eﬀects will necessarily depend on the disaggregation and classification of industries
and commodity flows. Our model must be regarded as rather disaggregated, specifying 40
production sectors and 60 commodity groups. However, the substitution within each sector
will in reality be due to both genuine factor substitution within firms and reallocation
between firms and subsets of firms within the specified sectors. Another classification of
firms might have produced diﬀerent estimates of the contribution from the specified eﬀects
to the price sensitivity of aggregate electricity demand. However, the results presented
above are likely to be quite robust as long as the most electricity intensive industries are
explicitly singled out in the model.
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Appendix
Analytical expressions for εAj:
εAj captures the eﬀect on ZEj of general equilibrium eﬀects on other prices than the
electricity price. εAj is given by
εAj = εEFjPˆFj + εEKM jPˆKMj + εELjPˆLj (35)
+εETjPˆTj + εEV jPˆVj + εEKBjPˆKBj ,
where the terms on the r.h.s. are defined as
εEFj =
£
σUj − σNjθNKMj −
£
σRjθRLj +
¡
σRTjθRTTj
+
¡
σSjθSV j + σV FjθV FKBjθSRTj
¢
θRTRj
¢
θRNj
¤
θNUj
¤
θUFj,
εEKM j =
£
σNj − σRjθRLj −
£
σRTjθRTTj
+
¡
σSjθSV j + σV FjθV FKBjθSRTj
¢
θRTRj
¤
θRNj
¤
θNKMj ,
εELj =
¡
σRj − σRTjθRTTj −
¡
σSjθSV j + σV FjθV FKBjθSRTj
¢
θRTRj
¢
θRLj,
εETj =
¡
σRTj − σSjθSV jθRRTj − σV FjθV FKBjθSRTj
¢
θRTTj ,
εEV j =
¡
σSj − σV FjθV FKBj
¢
θSV j ,
εEKBj = σV FjθV FKBj.
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Figure 1: The preference structure of households in MSG6
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Figure 2: The production structure of firms in MSG6
Variable Input Structures
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